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During the first half of the eighties, the U.S. federal deficit
rose from $ 74 bn to $ 212 bn. When the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) projected" in August 1985 that the deficit would
further increase to $ 285 bn by 1990, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act (GRH Act) was put into law. Its purpose is to help the
government with cutting the deficit, even more, to force it
into doing so. Congress and the president put themselves into
this confined situation by voting for and signing the bill,
respectively, because they realized that their differences in
budget priorities would continue to cause budget deadlocks. The
GRH Act specifies deficit targets for each year which decline
at equal steps to reach zero in the final year, which is now
supposed to be 1993. There have been deficit targets before,
but they were regularly passed over in the budget process. This
is not possible now, because the sequestration procedure,- the
prominent feature of the GRH Act, requires that federal go-
vernment expenditures - on defense and nondefense likewise - be
cut "automatically" if the regular budget process does not re-
duce the federal budget deficit to the specified amount.
The GRH Act which has given rise to much discussion has now
been in effect for over four years. During that time, it has
been revised once, and another revision is presently being con-
sidered. This paper is an attempt to evalue the GRH Act. First
the development which led to the law will be briefly reviewed.
Then the idea of the law will be discussed, including the
question whether the deficit concept used is correct. Finally,
the experience with the GRH Act will be discussed as well as
the possibility of another revision.- 2 -
Developments Leading to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
The GRH Act was not the first budget act that was put into law
out of fear that the federal budget deficit was getting out of
control. In 1921, the Budget and Accounting Act was created in
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response to a series of deficits, exacerbated by World War I.
With this act Congress delegated power over the budget to the
president, in particular, the right to initiate the budget,
hoping that this would make the budget process more efficient.
During the following quarter century, the budget was still in
deficit, mainly because of the two World Wars and the Great
Depression, but in the subsequent years it generally was in
surplus. The Budget Act of 1921 was kept until the mid-seven-
ties. At the beginning of the seventies, Congress and President
Nixon got into a major dispute when the president used the
right to freeze funds (impoundment) to prevent expenditures
which Congress had approved against his will. As a consequence,
Congress made a new law, the Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974. This act did not only limit the president's power to
freeze funds, it also served Congress to retrieve several other
rights over the budget it had previously delegated to the pre-
sident.
One major goal of the new budget law, to curb the rise in fe-
deral expenditures permanently, was not achieved mainly for two
reasons. First, each government agency was trying to move more
and more expenditures off budget, which meant that these expen-
ditures were no longer under the control of the appropriation
committees. Second, social security expenditures were increa-
sed considerably during the seventies . and eighties, among
others as a consequence of the indexation and the population
growth. This did not lead to an increase in the general level
of expenditures at first, because growth in defense expenditu-
res slowed down noticeably during the early seventies. But
later in the decade (thus still under the Carter Administra-
tion) and during the first half of the eighties, defense spen-
ding rose considerably, and so did total expenditures.- 3 -
In 1981, considerable tax cuts were put into law. It was first
expected that these measures would stimulate working efforts
and growth and would thereby increase tax income. Instead, tax
revenues increased considerably slower than before. This was
exacerbated by the recession of 1980-82, which also led to ad-
ditional expenditures. As a consequence of these developments,
the federal budget deficit increased at the beginning of the
eighties. Congress continued to reject cuts of social security
benefits and the president did neither approve decreases in
defense spending nor a rise in tax rates. In every year after
1981, the president's budget proposal was declared dead on ar-
o
rival; i.e., Congress did not use it for its budget planning.
In view of these problems, the decision-making process used for
preparing the budget came under much criticism. It was argued
that this process was not conducive to cutting the deficit,
because congressmen, who in principle might favor a reduction
of the deficit, had to secure certain projects, in order to . be
reelected. This would lead to the tendency to form coalitions
in which every one would vote for the other congressmen's fa-
vorite project in exchange for their vote on his favorite pro-,
ject (logrolling), the result being a higher expenditure level
than what would have been optimal. This view led to the con-
clusion that the fiscal process had to be subjected to rules
9
valid in the long run. The GRH Act was the first attempt to
apply this idea. After a Senate proposal to stop indexation of
social security benefits for one year, to freeze real defense
expenditures, and to increase taxes had been rejected in spring
1985, the GRH Act was proposed by the Senate in the following
summer. To assure its acceptance, the act was added to a bill
to authorize an increase in the debt ceiling (from $ 1824 bn to
$ 2078 bn) which was unlikely to be rejected. In effect, after
a couple of changes had been made, the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act, in short, the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act , was put into law and was signed by the pre-
sident on December 13, 1985.- 4 -
As expected by many from the beginning, the GRH Act was ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1986, the reason being
that the General Accounting Office (GAO) which was dependent on
Congress transmitted the necessary expenditure cuts to the pre-
sident. This violated the division of powers. The revision of
the GRH Act which followed this ruling in 1987 was used to
raise at the same time the deficit ceilings, because it was
recognized that it would be very difficult to bring the deficit
12 below the required limit.
The major provisions of the GRH Act of 1987
- The GRH Act prescribes deficit ceilings for the federal
budget which decline by $ 36 bn from year to year to reach
zero in the final year, which is now 1993; according to the
law of 1985, it was 1991 (Table I).
1
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Table 1 - Federal Deficit and GRH-Ceilings (Billion Dollars )
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The president is obliged to heed the respective limits ,when
making his budget proposal at the beginning of each year for
the following fiscal year (starting October 1).
When the budget process conducted until August results in a
projected deficit for the following fiscal year that exceeds
the ceiling by more than $ 10 bn, then expenditures that have
not been explicitly exempted are cut in order to bring the
deficit down to the admissible amount. The cuts are equally
distributed over defense and nondefense expenditures.
The OMB estimates the necessary cuts and transmits them to
the President. (In the 1985 Act, both the OMB and the CBO had
to make the required estimations which they gave to the GAO,
in a joint report. The GAO checked them and, if necessary,
made a few changes, before transmitting its own report to the
president).
In case an agreement is reached between Congress and the pre-
sident to cut the deficit using alternative measures as, for
example, an increase in taxes or a cut in other expenditures,
then the sequestration procedure is not followed. If such an
alternative solution is not found by October 15, the across-
the-board cut, based on the updated OMB estimates, takes
place.
There are exceptions from this rule in case of war or in case
of a recession. The case for a recession is given if either
the OMB predicts two consecutive quarters of real growth less
than or equal to zero or if the Department of Commerce pu-
blishes rates below 1 p.c. for the preceding two quarters.
The Deficit Concept
The idea behind the GRH Act is that the federal deficit is too
high and should be cut down to zero. To prove that it is too
high, generally the official deficit numbers are used and it is- 6 -
argued that they have reached record levels. Indeed, in 1985,
when the GRH Act was created, the deficit was four times as
high as in wartime-1943 when the deficit amounted to $ 54.6 bn,
which remained the record level until 1975. However, an increa-
sing deficit and an increasing government debt alone does not
necessarily seem worrisome if the economy is growing.
One step in the right direction is to look at the deficit in
relation to gross national product. According to this concept,
in view of the increase in nominal GNP from roughly $ 2000 bn
to $ 4000 bn as it was observed from 1977 to 1985, a doubling
of the deficit during the same time would seem normal. Actual-
ly, the deficit has quadrupled during this period. This makes
the deficit quota of the eighties relatively high for peace-
time. However, although the deficit quota does consider the
fact that due to inflation a certain deficit or GNP is not
valued as much today as it would have been some time ago, it
does not take into account that inflation erodes the federal
debt. Thus, a period of high inflation does not only lead to
high expenditures, particularly, high interest payments, it
also devalues the current federal debt. To take care of this
effect we have to look at an adjusted deficit or else at the
14 debt in relation to GNP. But according to these measures,
too, the deficit was relatively high during the mid eighties.
Furthermore, even looking at the ratio of the inflation-adju-
sted deficit to GNP does not consider the effect the business
cycle has on the deficit. In a recession, not only do expendi-
tures rise more than usual and revenues increase less than usu-
al, but in addition, the GNP declines which together makes the
deficit ratio rise. Clearly, the business cycle argument would
help to discount the high deficits during the recessionary pe-
riod from 1980 to 1982. However, it does not explain why the
deficits kept rising after the economy started booming in the
following years. But even a deficit measure that is not only
inflation-adjusted but also adjusted for the business cycle
does yield the result that the US federal budget deficit was
15 exceptionally high during the mid eighties (Fig. 1}.- 7 -
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calculations.
Hence, it can be summarized that alternative measures lead to
the same conclusion as traditional deficit measures, which is
that in 1985 the deficit was at an unusually high level for
historical standards. If we consider, that high deficits place
a burden on future generations, given that they are not compen-
sated fully by higher private saving, the intention of the GRH
Act, to reduce the deficit seems justified. However, it is
not immediately plausible why the deficit in the special defi-
nition (which has flaws) should be reduced to zero. Why, for
example, should the government have a balanced budget if it's
net investment, leading to benefits in future periods, is po-
17 sitive?
As far as the rule is concerned to cut the deficit by $ 36 bn
year over year, at first sight it seems to make sense to have
such a stable and predictable rule. However, a problem arises
from the fact that the deficit measure used here is the offi-- 8 -
cial measure which neither takes into account inflation nor
growth nor the business cycle. What effect this has with regard
to the business cycle is quite obvious. During a period of
strong growth, due to higher tax revenues and lower unemploy-
ment expenditures, the deficit tends to decrease. Hence, in
order to obtain a deficit which is $ 36 bn lower than the pre-
vious year's level, that part of the deficit which is indepen-
dent of the business cycle will have to be cut by less than
$ 36 bn. This means that the GRH Act requires a smaller exo-
genous deficit cut with strong than with weak growth, implying
that the GRH Act has a procyclical effect. It works contrary to
the desired anticyclical effect of the economy's built-in
18 stabilizers (unemployment insurance, progressive tax system).
It would have been possible to avoid this procyclical effect by
designing the act in such a way that declining limits would
have been applied to an adjusted deficit measure or a certain
expenditure quota - better even a quota of a cyclically adju-
sted expenditure relative to trend GRH - would have been re-
quired. The major argument against such a solution was that it
would make the sequestration process even more complicated and
less predictable.
Experiences with the GRH Act
Originally, it was planned to apply the automatic expenditure
cuts to a very broad level of programs. This would have limited
the effect a cut would have on a single program. However, as a
result of the pressure of interest groups, several programs
were exempted from the automatic cuts. This had the effect that
the remaining programs now have to bear a relatively large bur-
den of each cut. This makes each across-the-board expenditure
cut seem more undesirable than otherwise and it increases the
pressure to find an alternative solution avoiding the seques-
tration.- 9 -
Optimistic Forecasts - Means to Avoid the Sequestration?
The GRH Act requires that expenditure cuts be determined before
19 the fiscal year begins. Therefore, revenues and expenditures
of the coming year have to be estimated. They usually are based
on projections concerning the economic development, which are,
of course, subject to great uncertainty. Clearly, the more op-
timistic an economic forecast, the lower the deficit projec-
tion, and the lower the required deficit cut. This relation has
led to the widely accepted view that the GRH Act must have in-
creased the tendency of government agencies, in particular the
OMB, to make optimistic projections in order to avoid deep ex-
penditure cuts which might in turn bring about a recession.
This idea is based on the contention that politicians always
take into account their chances of being reelected when making
their decisions, and these chances are generally lower after a
recession.
If the forecasting errors of the OMB are analyzed for the pe-
riod from 1977 to 1989, it is clear that the OMB has on average
overestimated the real growth rate by more than one percentage
20 point (Table 2). This exceeds the average prediction error
21 made by the CBO and private forecasters. On the other hand,
the OMB's predictions for the inflation and unemployment rates
have been somewhat more accurate than that of the other pre-
dictors. In order to check the contention that the GRH Act has
caused the OMB to overestimate the economic performance, the
focus should be merely on the predictions for the previous
three years, because the GRH Act was signed in 1985 and the
first forecast under the new law was the one made at the begin-
ning of 1986 for 1987. Surprisingly, the OMB's forecasting
error is not only smaller than the average forecasting error
for the whole period, it is even negative. Admittedly, the re-
sult might have to do with the fact that the last three years
were years of strong growth, whereas generally the estimation
errors are highest during turning points of the business cycle
22 (Fig.2). But up to this moment, it has to be concluded that
the argument that the OMB tends to overestimate growth in order- 10 -
Table 2 - Prediction Errors for Changes in U.S. Real GNP and GNP-Deflator and
for U.S. Unemployment Rates
Gross National Product GNP-Deflator Unemployment Rate
OMB
2 CBO
3 Private 4 OMB CBO Private OMB CBO Private
Forecasts Forecasts Forecasts
Mean Average
Error 1.16 0.68 0.47 0.09 0.38 0.40 -0.11 0.14 0.16
(-0.13) (-0.77) (-0.87) (0.27) (0.43) (0.30) (0.47) (0.77)(0.87)
Mean Absolute
(0.47) (0.77) (0.87) (0.53) (0.50) (0.43) (0.47) (0.77)(0.87)
Error 1.65 1.48 1.33 1.46 1.51 1.65 0.78 0.84 0.79
Mean Square
Error 2.38 2.06 2.06 1.69 1.77 1.91 1.09 1.11 1.06
(0.56) (0.90) (0.93) (0.63) (0.60) (0.48) (0.52) (0.79)(0.89)
12 3
Yearly average.- Office of Management and Budget.- Congressional Budget
Office.- Average of private forecasts.- E (Forecast-actual value)/number of
observations. Numbers in brackets refer to the_period 1987 to 1989.- E XFo-
recast-actual value)/number of observations.- E (Forecast-actual value) /
number of observations.
Source: James A. Howard, Government Economic Projections: A Comparison Be-
tween CBO and OMB Forecasts, ibid, for the projections of OMB and
CBO prior to 1986.- Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of
the United States, Washington, 1989.- Congressional Budget Office,
The Economic and Budget Outlook, Washington, var. issues.- The Confe-
rence Board Statistical Bulletin, New York, var. issues.- Own calcu-
lations.
to avoid large budget cuts cannot be confirmed by the available
data. Similarly is the average prediction error of the unem-
ployment rate higher and positive for the last three years
rather than lower which we would expect from a forecast in-
tended to keep expenditure cuts low. The average inflation pro-
jection error is only slightly higher for 1987-1989 than for
the whole period considered, and it is not clear whether this
would serve to minimize automatic cuts, given on one hand
higher tax revenues but on the other hand higher interest pay-
ments and other expenditures.- 11 -
Figure 2 - Projected and Actual Unemployment Rates and














1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
Forecasts made at the beginning of the year for the following year,
respectively.-
 2 Percentage changes.-
 3 Published by the conference Board.
Source: Office of Management and Budget. The Budget of the United
States, Washington 1976-1989. - Congress of the United States,
Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook.
Washington 1976-1989. - The Conference Board, Statistical Bulle-
tin. New York. February 1976-1989.- 12 -
Measures to Reduce the Budget Deficit
The GRH Act focuses on the unified budget, not merely at expen-
ditures and revenues that are on-budget. This has stopped the
trend of moving more and more expenditures off budget in order
to escape regular budget control and to keep the official bud-
get figures low. Recently, off-budget expenditures as a share
of total expenditures declined after having risen for several
decades (Table 3). However, there are still possibilities to
move expenditures off the unified budget, and other methods to
decrease the official deficit measure have either been used
more intensively or have been discovered since the GRH Act was
put into law. A close look at the previous years' budget deci-
sions reveals such measures.
Table 3 - Federal On-Budget and Off-Budget Outlays
1950
1 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1989
On-budget
outlays 98.6 94.3 88.2 86.0 85.9 81.8 80.7 80.5 80.7 81.5
Off-budget
outlays 1.4 5.7 11.8 14.0 14.1 18.2 19.3 19.5 19.3 18.5
Fiscal years.
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, Report of the President, Washington
1989.- Own calculations.
The GRH Act was signed in December 1985, when fiscal year 1986
(running from October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1986) already
had started. For this reason the maximum amount of automatic
cuts was restricted to $ 11.7 billion, which was exactly the
amount by which total expenditures were eventually cut as the
president and Congress could not come to an agreement about
23 alternative measures to reduce the deficit; the resulting
deficit was $ 221 billion. Starting fiscal year 1987, such mea-
sures were found. Despite the fact that the GRH Act was de-
clared unconstitutional and did not pose a threat anymore as
fiscal year 1987 approached, the decision was made to cut theBlbliofhek
f
- 13 -
deficit by $ 31 billion to the estimated value of $ 151 bil-
lion, just below the maximum admissible amount of $ 154 billion
(including an error margin of $ 10 billion). However, these
cuts included $ 8 billion of asset sales, $ 10 billion of addi-
tional tax revenues due to an increase in the capital gains tax
which were matched by lower tax revenues in future years, and
$ 3 billion of one-time savings due to a deferral of a military
25 pay raise from September 30 to October 1. Thus less than half
of the $ 31 billion deficit cut in 1987 consisted of permanent
savings, and the decline in the federal deficit from $ 221 bii-
lion in 1986 to $ 150 billion in 1987 was mainly due to the
good economic development and these one-time savings.
For the budget of 1988, the deficit limit was $ 144 billion
according to the revised GRH Act, instead of $ 108 billion as
required by the original law. The new law exempted various
transactions as, for example, asset sales from counting towards
the GRH reduction. Nevertheless, the agreement to cut the bud-
get deficit by $ 33 billion reached in December 1987 following
the stock market crash included $ 8 billion of asset sales as
well as one-time savings due to a change in tax collection da-
tes. (The deficit eventually came to $ 155 billion.) At the
same time, it was agreed to reduce the 1989 budget deficit by $
46 billion; this decision was subsequently incorporated in the
president's budget proposal for 1989. The budget cut - later
reduced to roughly $ 33 billion - was to be reached through
higher tax revenues in the order of $ 14 billion and reductions
26 both in military and nonmilitary spending. As it became clear
in the course of the budget year that the strong economy would
lead to a greater deficit reduction than expected, an additio-
nal bill was passed to include $ 20 billion to be spent on the
ailing savings and loan industry; these expenditures had ori-
ginally been located outside the budget. As a consequence, the
actual deficit in fiscal year 1989 amounted to $ 152 billion
and thus exceeded the admissible limit. This was possible, be-
cause, according to the GRH Act, the automatic across-the-board
cut is only triggered at the beginning of the fiscal year, not
during the year.- 14 -
For fiscal year 1990 an agreement was reached in April 1989 to
cut the deficit by $ 28 billion so as to push it below the ad-
missible GRH limit of $ 108 billion (excluding the $ 10 billion
error margin). Again, this incorporates one-time savings as,
for example, an earlier collection of firms' social security
contributions and the exclusion of the deficitary postal budget
from the federal budget. Furthermore, expenditures in connec-
tion with the bailout of the savings and loans industry amoun-
ting to $ 30 billion were not put on the official budget and
therefore do not count towards the deficit. Finally, notwith-
standing the OMB's accurate growth projections of previous
years, there is reason to believe that the forecast of 2.6 per-
cent real growth for the current year is somewhat too optimis-
tic, the OMB itself has already raised its deficit projection
to $ 124 billion.
Another Revision of the GRH Act?
Recently it has been discussed to revise the GRH Act once more.
In particular, due to the current weakness of the economy as
well as high costs involved in the bailout of the savings and
loans industry, it is to be doubted that the GRH limits for the
coming years, starting with $ 64 billion in fiscal year 1991,
can be met, despite the growing surplus in the social security
system. (The latter has attracted much attention during the
last couple of months due to senator Moynihan's proposal to
lower social security tax rates.) Therefore, it has been sug-
gested to increase the deficit limits one more time, possibly
in connection with a stricter regulation as to what can count
towards a deficit reduction. However, a further revision of the
GRH Act might well lower the credibility of US fiscal policy
which has already suffered from the first revision and the
various one-time savings measures. Therefore, it has to be en-
sured that the new GRH Act would be effective enough to out-
weigh these credibility problems.- 15 -
As to the effectiveness of the law until now, it is clear that
the reduction of the federal budget deficit from $ 221 billion
in 1986 to $ 152 billion in 1989 can barely be attributed to
the GRH Act. First of all, the economic activity was strong in
recent years. According to the National Income and Product Ac-
counts, the deficit (defined slightly differently from the usu-
al measure) has declined by roughly $ 70 billion within the
same time span; however, when cyclical effects are taken into
account, the remaining deficit reduction only came to $ 20 bil-
27 lion. Secondly, during this period the surplus of the social
security system which is presently included in the unified bud-
get increased from $ 9 billion to $ 56 billion, thus bringing
28 the deficit down. On the other hand, it has to be remembered
that the CBO projected in 1985 that with current law the defi-
cit would increase to $ 285 billion in 1990, not stay at the
same level. This projection did also include the increase in
the social security surplus, and the underlying economic fore-
casts turned out to be quite accurate. Furthermore, the share
of government expenditures in GNP, which had been rising for
long, has declined in recent years. Hence, the GRH Act has had
some, even if quite limited success.
As far as the credibility of fiscal policy is concerned, it has
suffered considerably from the fact that the GRH Act was barely
able to induce politicians to make sensible and far-reaching
expenditure cuts. Budget decisions were made with the intention
to reduce the deficit below a certain limit, often ignoring the
economics involved in these decisions. This and the revision of
the law in 1987 have created much uncertainty in recent years,
contrary to what one would expect from a fiscal policy which is
conducted according to a certain rule. Such uncertainty is not
a good environment for saving, investment, and growth in ge-
neral. It can also cause international investors to request a
higher risk premium, hence raising the US interest level.
If the GRH Act should be revised one more time, it is not
sufficient to raise the deficit limits. Instead, there should
be stricter rules as to what can count toward the deficit re-- 16 -
duction and there should be a mechanism that cuts expenditures
to a certain extent in the course of the year in case the de-
ficit turns out to be much higher than projected at the be-
ginning of the fiscal year. Furthermore, it would be desirable,
even if slightly more complicated, to apply a rule of declining
deficits to a cyclically and inflation-adjusted deficit mea-
sure. Finally, if the steps of $ 36 billion seem to be too
wide, once one-time savings measures are disallowed and. once
the social security system is excluded from the budget (if that
happens at all), it seems wiser to reduce the required reduc-
tions from year to year right away than risking another revi-
sion of the law. Should a far-reaching revision of the GRH Act
not be politically feasible, it might well be advisable to
abandon the law altogether.- 17 -
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